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Abstract
Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have
a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects
around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience it-
self. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can
infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the
nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details
for these two facts, and bridges the gap between them. Our aim in this paper
is three-fold: to scrutinize Michael Tye’s transparency theory (2002, 2009,
2014a), introduce a new transparency theory, and advance a meta-theoretical
hypothesis about the interest and import of transparency theories in general.
1 Transparency Theories
You are at a weekend barbecue. Someone is grilling onions. This occasions an ol-
factory experience of grilled onions. Shortly thereafter, your friend remarks about
the beautiful early evening sky. This draws your attention skyward, occasioning
a visual experience of a sunset. When you introspect these experiences, you are
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aware of certain phenomenal properties—henceforth, ‘p-properties.’1 Unlike oc-
curring on the weekend, these properties type your experiences by what it is like
to have them. They characterize an aspect of that experience’s phenomenal char-
acter, which captures the entirety of what it is like to undergo that experience.
The p-properties I am aware of when I have an experience of a sunset are differ-
ent from those you are aware of when you have an olfactory experience of grilled
onions. These experiences thus have distinct phenomenal characters; they fall into
distinct phenomenal kinds.
The going consensus is that introspection reveals that these p-properties seem
to be ordinary external properties, properties that physical objects can have. Ar-
guably the most famous expression of this consensus comes from Gilbert Harman:
When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all
experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them
are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she
experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her expe-
riences. And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about
Eloise’s visual experience. When you see a tree, you do not experi-
ence any features as intrinsic features of your experience. Look at a
tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual
experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn
your attention to will be features of the presented tree...(1990: 39)
Harman is claiming that experience is transparent.2 When Eloise sees the tree
and its leaves, she has an experience. She is, let us say, aware of phenomenal
greenness—that p-property associated with my normal experiences of some fine-
grained shade of greenness. But, as Harman notes, the property she sees is seen as
a property of the tree, not as a property of her experience of the tree. Phenomenal
1The term ‘phenomenal property’ is occasionally used to denote a property that is mental by
stipulation. On our usage this is not built in.
2The notion of transparency arguably originated with G.E. Moore (1922), although it’s unclear
whether Moore actually endorsed transparency. See Kind (2003) and Stoljar (2004) for discussion.
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green is thus plausibly just ordinary green. Indeed, she doesn’t really seem to be
aware of her experience at all.3 Such is the basic idea behind transparency. It is
supposed to generalize. And it is supposed to yield an interesting metaphysical
lesson about the relationship between an experience and the p-properties that type
an experience by what it is like to have it. Yet the precise nature of that lesson is
unsettled.
We seek to make headway on this issue. Let a transparency theory be the
conjunction of three claims:
An Introspective Claim A claim about the way p-properties seem to a subject
upon introspection—e.g. that they seem to be proper-
ties of objects in the subject’s ambient environment,
not properties of the experience itself.
A Metaphysical Claim A claim concerning a disconnect between p-properties
and our experiences of them—e.g. that p-properties
are not properties of experience.
An Auxiliary Claim A claim that facilitates the inference from the intro-
spective claim to the metaphysical claim.
There is a strict reading of ‘what does it mean to say that experience is trans-
parent?’ where permissible answers are confined to the way things seem upon
introspection. This would identify the thesis of transparency with the introspec-
tive claim. The problem is that this way of capturing the debate would leave out
much that is interesting, and where much of the action is: finding an auxiliary
claim that allow us to move beyond the way things seem in introspection to the
way things are.4
3This is standardly understood in terms of de re awareness. Eloise might still be aware that she
is having an experience. See Tye (2009:5) and Tye (2014a: 40). For the various ways of formulating
this portion of the transparency claim—something we don’t touch on here—see Gottlieb (2016).
4When we say that ‘experience is transparent,’ we are referring to the introspective claim.
When we ask ‘what follows from transparency’ (or related questions), context will make clear
whether we are asking what follows from the metaphysical claim or just the introspective claim.
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Michael Tye’s (2002, 2009, 2014) transparency theory is the most developed
and influential in the literature. Tye’s metaphysical claim is an externalist thesis
about p-properties:
P-Externalism P-properties, if instantiated at all, are instantiated by objects
in the subject’s ambient environment; moreover, p-properties
are frequently instantiated.
P-Externalism involves two claims. The first implies that our experiences never in-
stantiate p-properties, and that in non-veridical experiences p-properties are unin-
stantiated. The second implies that most experiences are veridical on the supposi-
tion, given voice to by Harman, that p-properties seem to be instantiated by objects
in one’s environment.
P-Externalism is supposed to have stark implications for the nature of per-
ceptual experience. It entails that both qualia realism and projectivism are false.5
And, according to Tye, we can use P-Externalism in an abductive inference to an
externalist version of representationalism, on which p-properties are represented
properties.6
Of course, there is plenty of action surrounding the introspective claim too, typically with respect
to its purported universality (e.g. Block 1996; Kind 2003; Smith 2008). But here we just assume it,
focusing on its implications once supplemented with an appropriate auxiliary claim. Also, when
it is said that transparency tells us nothing much at all, the focus is on the introspective claim
(e.g. Schroer 2007). We grant this; the introspective claim can be accommodated by just about any
theory of perceptual experience (cf. Gupta 2012: 12; Frey 2013; Gow 2016). The auxiliary claim
does the heavy lifting.
5Our focus is on literal projectivism, as opposed to figurative projectivism; on the former,
colors are instantiated in the visual system, and in virtue of this instantiation objects look col-
ored, while on the latter, colors are uninstantiated (Shoemaker 1994). For literal projectivism, see
Boghossian & Velleman (1989) and Averill (2005); for figurative projectivism, see Averill (1992);
Wright (2003).
6Every use of ‘representationalism’, unless noted otherwise, should be understood as referring
to externalist representationalism. P-Externalism embodies Tye’s claim that “[t]he phenomenal
character of an experience...is out there in the world” (2009: 119). We are aware of p-properties.
Thus P-Externalism also follows from Tye’s (2014: 41) claim that “[t]he only features of which we
are aware and to which we can attend are external features,” and that, in non-veridical experience,
“[t]he only features of which we are aware and to which we can attend are locally un-instantiated
features of a sort that, if they belong to anything, belong to external particulars.” For the claim
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We have three aims: one negative, one positive, and one meta-theoretical. Our
negative aim is to scrutinize Tye’s theory and show that it is flawed. Our positive
aim is to develop a new transparency theory. Unlike Tye’s theory, our theory is
consistent with projectivism and qualia realism, and it provides no evidence for
representationalism or naive realism. But it does tell us something about the nature
of p-properties themselves. This is a feature, not a bug, and it bears on our meta-
theoretical thesis.
To see why, consider the criterion for a metaphysical claim in our above
schema. It is broad. It speaks only of ‘some disconnect’ between p-properties and
our experiences of them, leaving open the nature of that disconnect, and whether
it reveals more about p-properties than it does about perceptual experiences. This
is by design. Much attention to transparency in the literature has been due to the
idea that transparency, or transparency theories, can tell us something important
about the nature of perceptual experience. This is clearly Tye’s motivation, and
it evinces a certain meta-theoretical position, viz. that transparency is of inter-
est because we can use it to sort through different candidate positions regarding
what having a perceptual experience consists in. Tye is thus an optimist about the
prospects of transparency being a game changer in this way.
We think that the optimistic position is misguided. Consider the following
remarks from Alex Byrne and Heather Logue:
[T]he transparency of experience fits nicely with the view that in hav-
ing an experience of, say, a tomato, although one may be in a position
to learn something about the essence of the tomato, one is not a po-
sition to learn much of anything about the essence of the experience
(2008: 82).
Byrne and Logue are (tacitly) advancing a modest meta-theoretical position. On
this view, the lesson and interest of transparency concerns not the nature of percep-
tual experience, but the nature of the objects of experience—what our experiences
that P-Externalism is incompatible with qualia realism, see Tye (2014: 42-43). For the inference
to representationalism as the best explanation of P-Externalism, see Tye (2002: 141).
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are of.7 Note that there is a sense in which the modest position is far more mod-
est than the optimistic position. For the latter does not say that we do not learn
about the nature of the objects of experience from transparency. It just makes the
additional claim that we learn about experiences themselves, either directly, or
indirectly via what we learn about the objects of experience. The modest posi-
tion only differs by denying that we learn anything of substance concerning the
essence of perceptual experience.
Byrne and Logue also consider a skeptical meta-theoretical position:
Transparency goes naturally with modesty about experience—we know
little of the nature of experiential episodes. What’s more, it goes nat-
urally with skepticism about experience—there are no experiential
episodes to begin with (ibid: 83, our emphasis).
Here the lesson of transparency is that perceptual experiences don’t exist.8
We won’t go so far as to endorse the skeptical position. But we agree with
Byrne and Logue that transparency “fits nicely” with the modest position; after all,
the Harman-esque insight behind transparency is that we don’t seem to be aware of
our experiences anyway. (Eloise only experiences the tree.) So the modest position
is prima facie plausible.
Our third aim, then, is to strengthen the case for the modest position. In broad
strokes, our argument runs like this. If Tye’s theory is unsuccessful—if arguably
the most developed position on transparency and its implication fails to vindi-
cate the optimistic position—and if our theory is successful, the modest position,
while perhaps not fully vindicated, will be on surer footing. This is important,
since it will have the effect of potentially re-directing efforts when thinking about
transparency.
7On our usage, ‘objects’ of experience include objects proper, properties, and property-
instances.
8This is skepticism about experiences qua particular mental events. As Byrne (2011: 64) notes,
such skepticism allows that we can still truthfully say things like ‘Going to Tahiti was a relaxing
experience,’ suitably paraphrased. See Speaks (2014) for a similar skeptical position based on
transparency.
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2 Tye’s Transparency Theory
Suppose you have a visual experience as of a red balloon. Your experience has
a certain phenomenal character which is (chiefly) characterized by specific p-
properties of shape (roundness) and color (redness). You are aware of these prop-
erties and they seem to be properties of the balloon, not properties of the very
experience you are undergoing. Since you are inclined to take appearances at face-
value you conclude that the balloon is in fact round and red.
Generalizing from this description over any phenomenal property F, any sub-
ject S, and any experience E, the introspective component of Tye’s theory is this:
I-Claim When S is aware of F in virtue of having E, (i-I) F will seem (to S)
to be a property of an object in Ss ambient external environment
(including S’s body), and (ii-I) neither F, nor any of the features
of F, will seem to S to be a property of E itself.9
I-Claim holds for hallucinatory experiences, because, according to Tye (2002:
141; cf. 2014a), hallucination is a matter of standing in an awareness relation to
uninstantiated p-properties. If S had a hallucinatory experience as of a red balloon,
there would be no balloon to instantiate F (redness). Yet F will still seem to be to
be property of the balloon (i-I), and F will not seem to S to be a property of her
experience of the balloon (ii-I).10
Tye thinks that P-Externalism follows from I-Claim and his auxiliary claim.
The main burden of this section is to scrutinize the inference from I-Claim to
P-Externalism. This requires a close examination of Tye’s auxiliary claim. But
9Two points. First, we stress that I-Claim is Tye’s introspective claim. This is not to say that we
think I-Claim is implausible; it is plausible. But the form and generality of the introspective claim
is certainly not entirely stable throughout the literature on transparency. For other versions of the
introspective claim, compare Kind (2003), Stoljar (2004), Molyneux (2009), and Kennedy (2009).
Second, I-Claim can be formulated without committing to the existence of experiences—and so
consistent with the skeptical meta-theoretical position—by simply say that the only thing F seems
to be a property of are objects in S’s environment.
10We assume, with Tye (2014ab), that one is aware of p-properties in hallucination. For a con-
trary view, see Pautz (2007).
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before doing so, we’ll explore the relationship between P-Externalism and Tye’s
optimistic meta-theoretical position.
2.1 P-Externalism and the Optimistic Position
P-Externalism is, in the first instance, a claim about the objects of experience—
our experiences are, amongst other things, of p-properties. P-Externalism implies
that qualia realism is false. That’s no doubt an important result, but to what extent
would this vindicate the optimistic position? One might suggest that it vindicates
the position insofar as we would now know what experiences are not: they are
not mental events with intrinsic non-intentional properties that type them phe-
nomenologically. Yet this advance is, in another sense, not really an advance at all
for the optimist. For notice that, in establishing the falsity of qualia realism, we
have removed one reason for thinking there are experiences to begin with—viz.
that they are those things that instantiate the p-properties we are aware of when
we consciously see, hear, smell and feel. The upshot is that, when transparency
tells us what an experience is not, not what experiences are, this won’t vindicate
the optimistic position if, in the process, we are given less reason to believe in
experiences anyway.
Now if P-Externalism gave us evidence for representationalism, we will have
gone some way towards vindicating the optimist. P-Externalism is consistent with
representationalism, and—as noted—the argument from P-Externalism to repre-
sentationalism is abductive, meant to rule against other P-Externalism-consistent
views like naive realism. There is an oddity here, though. If P-Externalism is true,
p-properties can be represented unconsciously. This is because, by P-Externalism,
p-properties are just properties of objects around us.11 So even if by abduction P-
Externalism implied that experiences are representations, we wouldn’t know what
it is that makes these representations experiences. We wouldn’t know this because
we would not have singled out anything that experiences uniquely represent. Thus
11Unless you don’t believe in unconscious perception. This route will be appealing to very few
(if any) representationalists, and certainly not to Tye.
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we would be no closer to ascertaining the difference between unconscious percep-
tion and conscious perceptual experience. Of course, this point is not lost on Tye
(2000; 2014b), which is why he appeals to a functional role property—viz. being
poised to impact the right cognitive centers—to distinguish conscious and uncon-
scious perception. But Tye did not arrive at this conclusion from an abductive
argument from P-Externalism for representationalism.
We don’t downplay the importance of P-Externalism. If it turned out that p-
properties were just properties of objects around us, then perhaps they would just
be ordinary physical properties, which would thus make naturalizing the mind
easier.12 And it might be that these properties play a role in the identity conditions
for perceptual experience, as Tye would have it. Yet this still does little to tell us
what experiences themselves actually are, even assuming they are representations.
This is because the properties that individuate experiences phenomenologically
are not properties of the experience, and not everything that represents them is
an experience. So our general point is that the connection between P-Externalism
and the optimistic meta-theoretical position is tenuous at best. What we argue for
next, however, is that Tye’s case for P-Externalism is quite weak anyway.
2.2 From I-Claim to P-Externalism
In moving from I-Claim to P-Externalism, Tye says this:
To suppose that the qualities of which perceivers are directly aware in
undergoing ordinary everyday visual experiences are really qualities
of the experience would be to convict such experiences of massive er-
ror. That is just not credible. It seems totally implausible to hold that
visual experience is systematically misleading in this way. Accord-
ingly, unless it can be shown that serious trouble ensues, the qualities
12Tye wants to say that p-properties are physical properties, but strictly speaking it’s not clear
that this follows from P-Externalism. Presumably, for P-Externalism to show that p-properties are
physical properties it would have to follow from P-Externalism alone that p-properties enter laws
or causal interactions at the level of physics.
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of which you are directly aware in focusing on the scene before your
eyes and how things look are not qualities of your visual experience
(2002: 139).
Tye’s auxiliary claim can thus be stated as follows:
Veridicality Perpetual experience is not systematically misleading; gener-
ally, if in virtue of having E, x seems F to S, then x is F.
The question we are entertaining, then, is this: how exactly does Tye employ
Veridicality to bridge I-Claim and P-Externalism? We will look at this from two
angles; first, a deductive one, and second, an abductive one.13
2.2.1 The Deductive Reading
Bernard Molyneux (2009) treats Tye’s inference deductively. But as he points out,
the second conjunct (ii-I) of I-Claim—that F does not seem to be a property of
E—is really a fifth wheel. It’s a claim about what experiences doesn’t tell us. It
doesn’t say that we are aware of F as not being a property of E (ibid: 120). So it
is the first conjunct (i-I) of I-Claim that is doing the work. Following Molyneux
(ibid) once more, here is a deductive reading of Tye’s argument:
T1D When S has a perceptual experience of F, F seems to be (to S) a property
of an object in S’s environment. [(i-I)]
T2D Perceptual experience is not misleading in this respect.
∴ F is a property of an object in S’s environment.
T3D If F is a property of an object in S’s environment, then F is not a property
of E.
∴ F is not a property of E.
13We thank an anonymous referee for pushing us to consider the abductive version.
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The argument has three premises: T1D, T2D, and T3D. We are granting T1D since
we are granting I-Claim. The naive realist would likely reject T3D, insisting that
there is a sense in which external objects and property-instances partly constitute
our experiences (cf. Kennedy 2009). We’ll bracket that though, and focus on T2D.
The first thing to note is that T2D is not actually Veridicality. This is intentional.
Veridicality is not strong enough to do the work Tye wants, since it wont allow
him to infer that F is a property of an object in S’s environment from T1. This is
because Veridicality only says that experience is not generally misleading when it
attributes F to x. It is consistent with this that there are at least some F’s that are
falsely attributed to x. So T2D seems better.
But now there is another problem, for P-Externalism is supposed to be a fully
general thesis, i.e. one that covers both veridical and non-veridical experiences
(Tye 2014a: 41). Again: P-Externalism says that if F is instantiated, it is instan-
tiated in some external object. In illusory and hallucinatory cases the antecedent
of this conditional is (plausibly) assumed to be false. The metaphysical lesson of
I-Claim is not supposed to be a restricted one, such that when E is hallucinatory,
the F we are aware of in virtue of being in E is also instantiated by E. In such
cases, F is simply uninstantiated. Saying otherwise cuts against everything Tye
wants out of a transparency theory.
Here T1D and T2D imply that F is a property of an object in S’s environment.
Thus the following T1D-T2D conditional holds: if S has a perceptual experience
of F, then F is instantiated in some external object. The problem is that, within
the contextual assumptions of Tye’s argument, this T1D-T2D conditional is false
for illusion and hallucination because the generality of P-Externalism depends on
the assumption that in the case of illusion and hallucination F is uninstantiated. In
illusions and hallucinations S has a perceptual experience of F (the antecedent of
the T1D-T2D conditional is true), but F is not a property of an object in S’s envi-
ronment (the consequent of the T1D-T2D conditional is false). Since the argument
for the T1D-T2D conditional from the T1D and T2D premises is valid at least one of
these premises is false; clearly that premise is T2D.
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This point shows that on Tye’s theory the generality of P-Externalism is incon-
sistent with the way P-Externalism is supported. The upshot is that, on the assump-
tion that the metaphysical lesson is to hold in all cases—that is, in both veridical
and non-veridical experience—Veridicality cannot stand alone as Tye’s sole aux-
iliary thesis. But instead of seeing how Veridicality could be supplemented in
a deductive argument for P-Externalism, it will be more instructive to see how
Veridicality works in an abductive argument for P-Externalism.
2.2.2 The Abductive Reading
The abductive version of Tye’s argument presumably goes something like this:
T1A p-properties seem to be properties of external objects, and they dont seem
to be properties of our experience.
T2A Perpetual experience is not systematically misleading.
T3A If true, P-Externalism would offer a better explanation of T1A and T2A and
then competing alternatives.
∴ P-Externalism is true.
T1A approximates I-Claim; T2A approximates Veridicality. But here Veridicality is
not really functioning as a premise—a claim that needs to be independently argued
for. Instead, it is a functioning a something like a desideratum, or a fixed data
point that we should all assume as a given. Tye seems to have this in mind when
he says that denying T2A is “just not credible” (2002: 139) and “seems totally
implausible” (2000: 46); beyond this, Tye never argues for Veridicality. What’s
being advanced in the abductive argument from I-Claim to P-Externalism, then,
is that P-Externalism is the best explanation of not just I-Claim, but Veridicality
too. Once we know that p-properties are properties of external objects in veridical
experience (by I-Claim and Veridicality), the simplest option is to let them go
uninstantiated in non-veridical experience. This is better (because simpler) than
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ending up with a dis-unified approach to perceptual experience on which veridical
and non-veridical experiences are different in kind.
To some audiences, this argument will be compelling. Yet it carries little force
against the opponent of P-Externalism. Both the qualia realist and projectivist re-
ject P-Externalism. But they also do, or at least can, endorse I-Claim. Projectivists
clearly do, and qualia realists can; as Gow (2016) points out, while qualia realist
have rejected I-Claim, there is certainly nothing about the position as such that
forces their hand. And this is good, since I-Claim, or something near enough, is
plausible.
Now if you accept I-Claim, but reject P-Externalism, then you will have to
reject T2A, i.e. Veridicality. And this, of course, is exactly what the projectivist
does. She does this not because she thinks Veridicality is absurd—it isn’t—but
because in the case of phenomenal colors (a kind of p-property) specifically, we
are dealing with something that (according to her lights) cannot be instantiated by
ordinary physical objects. So, not only is Veridicality not a fixed data point for all
parties, it is something that opponents of P-Externalism will naturally afford far
less weight than Tye. It is thus ineffective to take something that all parties do or
can agree to (I-Claim) and then supplement that with an assumption or desiderata
that your opponents do not or need not agree with (Veridicality), to then infer a
thesis (P-Externalism) that entails the falsity your opponent’s position.
For a related reason, the appeal to simplicity or parsimony doesn’t help ei-
ther since such considerations are germane only after it is agreed that all other
things are equal. If all parties concurred on the truth of Veridicality, then any the-
ory which countenanced p-properties as being instantiated by non-veridical ex-
periences would certainly count as less parsimonious, and for that reason have a
mark against it. Yet the whole point is that everyone does not agree on this much.
Anyone that ascribes to (say) projectivism will already be committed to rejecting
Veridicality if, as we are assuming, they ascribe to I-Claim.
In sum, Tye’s argument, when construed in abductive terms, won’t convince
anyone who isn’t already committed to P-Externalism. Tye’s abductive argument
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is thus unsuccessful.
3 A New Transparency Theory
Thus far, we have shown that the case for P-Externalism fails. We have also shown
that even if P-Externalism were true, it is limited in the extent to which it can
vindicate the optimistic meta-theoretical position. In this section, we set out our
competing transparency theory. We start in Sect. 3.1 by setting out our metaphys-
ical claim, and comparing it to Tyes P-Externalism. In Sect. 3.2 we introduce and
defend our auxiliary claim. Then in Sect. 3.3, we employ our auxiliary claim to
derive our metaphysical claim from I-Claim. Finally, Sect. 3.4 sets out the implica-
tions of our theory. Here the focus is on the objects of experience, not experiences
themselves. On this score, our ambitions are limited. But, when taken together
with the failure of Tye’s theory to vindicate the optimistic meta-theoretical posi-
tion, it provides evidence for the modest position.
Before we jump in, a terminological note. Phenomenal relations have been
implicit in our discussion, since relational p-properties are p-properties. However,
in this section we need to explicitly refer to phenomenal relations. We could do
this by referring to them as relational p-properties, but it is less awkward to refer
to them more simply as phenomenal relations, or p-relations. And we introduce
‘p-features’ as a catchall term, covering both p-properties (i.e. non-relational p-
properties) and p-relations (i.e. relational p-properties).
3.1 Our Introspective and Metaphysical Claims
Our introspective claim is the same as Tye’s, viz. I-Claim. This is critical, for we
are starting from the same introspective evidence. The question for all parties is
what we should conclude on the basis of this evidence.
Here is our metaphysical claim:
P-Essentialism For any p-feature F and any perceptual experience E of F,
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no p-relation holds between F and E that is essential to F.
P-Essentialism fits the metaphysical component of our schema. For if we deny P-
Essentialism—if we say that there is a p-relation between F and E that is essential
to F—then there is a significant metaphysical connection between p-properties
and our experience of them.
Two points of comparison between P-Essentialism and P-Externalism: First,
P-Externalism is about where p-features would be instantiated, if they were in-
stantiated, and adds that p-features are often instantiated. P-Essentialism makes
no such instantiation claim. However, we have seen that Tye’s use of Veridicality
to obtain this instantiation claim is dialectically illicit. So Tye is not entitled to
conclude that p-features are properties of the objects around us, and neither are
we from our transparency theory alone. Yet it’s worth noting that nothing in our
transparency theory is at odds with Veridicality. So our theory plus Veridicality
implies that p-features are properties of the objects around us.
Second, both P-Externalism and P-Essentialism make claims about the nature
of p-features, and so are in line with the modest position: that the F’s are prop-
erties of ordinary objects (on the former), and that there is no p-relation between
any F and any E that is essential to F (on the latter). We will also show, in section
3.4.1, that P-Essentialism plus a reasonable assumption implies that there is no
relation between F and E that is essential to F; that is, that p-features are mind-
independent. P-Externalism, by contrast, is consistent with phenomenalism about
p-features, since it is consistent with the claim that p-features are properties of
objects around us yet are mind-dependent (cf. Pelczar 2015). Granted, this dif-
ference is likely just a technicality; we find phenomenalism implausible, and we
venture that Tye does as well. Still, note that, in saying that p-features are mind-
independent, P-Essentialism arguably gives one as much of a metaphysical punch
as P-Externalism.
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3.2 Our Auxiliary Claim: Essential Features
Our auxiliary claim, and our argument for P-Essentialism, rests on our answer
to this basic question: What features of a p-feature must one be conscious of in
order to experience the p-feature? We begin our answer with two assumptions
about p-features, which we believe are uncontroversial.
The Type Assumption: p-features type perceptual experiences by what it is
like to have them. What it is like to have an experience—the totality of what it is
like—is given by that experience’s phenomenal character. P-features characterize
an aspect of that total phenomenal character by making a contributive phenomenal
difference to what it is like for the subject. My experience of a red square is in
some way phenomenally similar to my experience of a green square. But they
differ in their total phenomenal characters because some of the p-features (viz.
p-colors) that comprise their phenomenal characters are different—p-redness in
one case, p-greenness in the other.14 Types, not tokens, type experiences; that is,
p-feature types type experiences by what it is like to have them. A p-feature token
is an instantiated token that, experienced under normal conditions, is experienced
as an instance of a phenomenal type.
The Consciousness Assumption: we are conscious of p-features. It is unin-
telligible to claim that F types my experience by what it is like to have it, yet insist
that I am in no way conscious of F. The difference between my experience of a
red square and my experience of a green square is the presence and absence of
p-greenness and p-redness. I might not have to be aware that it is the presence
and absence of these p-properties that make my experiences differ phenomeno-
logically, but I do have to be conscious of the p-features in virtue of which there
is this difference.
But how exactly are we conscious of p-feature types? Suppose that subject S
14Many things can make a difference to experience without making a difference to an experi-
ences’ phenomenal character. The cosmological constant makes such a difference; if the constant
were different, there wouldn’t be any experiences. But there is no element of phenomenal char-
acter that corresponds to the cosmological constant. That’s why the cosmological constant isn’t a
p-feature. It is just an enabling condition for there being experiences at all.
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is looking at object x. And suppose that S is conscious of x as an F, then S is
conscious of x and conscious of F. Suppose x is a cow. S might be conscious of
a cow as a cow; or S might be conscious of a cow as a horse. If S is conscious
of a cow as a cow, then S is not only conscious of the physical cow, she is also
conscious of the property type—the cow type—that she attributed to the cow. (You
cannot be conscious of representing an object as having a property without being
conscious of the attributed property.) If S is conscious of a cow as a horse, then S
is not only conscious of the cow (a token) but she is also conscious of the property
type—the horse type—she attributed to the cow. So if F is a p-feature that types
S’s experience of x then S is conscious of the F as a p-feature type.15
With these assumptions in place, as a first step toward answering the basic
question consider now the following two claims. For a p-feature F to type experi-
ence E, F must type E with respect to all of F’s essential p-features; for otherwise
it would not be F that was typing E. And for a subject to be conscious of F the
subject must be conscious of all of the essential p-features of F; for otherwise the
subject would not be conscious of F.
These claims can be illustrated in multiple ways. First, consider the experience
of seeing a red patch. A subject S has a visual experience E of a red patch R. R
has a specific shade. Let it be scarlet. We will assume that the scarletness of R
types Ss experience E by what it is like to have it and that S is conscious of the
scarletness of R. So scarletness is a p-property. Scarletness has a specific hue (h),
saturation (s) and lightness (l). The h, s and l properties of scarletness identify its
location in a color space that lays out all the color shades of non-radiant objects
in the dimensions of hue, saturation and lightness. So h, s and l are what make
scarletness different from all other colors. Hence these properties—h, s and l—
15Here we think of tokens as the stimuli that can cause the visual system of a subject looking
at a token to type it. This is expressed in the S-is-conscious-of-x-as-an-F relation, where x is the
token and F is the type. The subject is conscious of both the type and the token. What we are
calling typing psychologist call categorizing. Understanding vision this way explains illusions—
the subject mistypes the token; and the duck-rabbit—the same token is typed in two different
ways; and color agnosia—the color agnosic cannot type tokens by color. The agnosic does not
experience the type; the hallucinator does not experience the token.
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are essential to scarletness. To experience scarletness, S must be conscious of h,
s and l. These properties type S’s experience phenomenologically, because if any
one of these properties were to change S would have a different experience with a
different phenomenal character. Scarletness would not phenomenologically type
E if h, s and l did not phenomenologically type E. The upshot is that h, s and l are
themselves p-properties—when S experiences scarletness, S is conscious of them
and there is something that it is like to experience them—and they are essential
properties of the p-property scarletness. They all make a contributive phenomenal
difference.
To make this point sharper, consider a related case. Suppose that a distinct
subject S* has a distinct visual experience E* of the same red patch R. Yet S*
only glances at R. She sees that it is red, but notices nothing more; that is, when
S* glances at R she is aware of its redness, its hue, but is not aware of whether
the color of R is crimson, scarlet or some other shade of red. What it is like for S*
to undergo E* is thus different from what it is like for S to undergo E. They have
different phenomenal characters. But that means there must be a difference in p-
features. The difference is between experiencing scarletness, as S does, and just
experiencing redness as S* does. True, there is likely some sense of experience in
which S* has an experience of scarletness. Yet S* does not, if you like, experience
scarletness as a p-property, because in whatever sense S* experiences scarletness,
it is not in a manner such that scarletness makes a contributive difference to the
experience’s phenomenal character.16 This is because, having only glanced at that
the patch, S* is not conscious of all the p-properties that are essential to scarlet-
ness. Only when S is conscious of all the p- properties essential to scarletness will
scarletness itself make a contributive difference to the phenomenal character of
E*. Only then will scarletness be a p-property—be experienced as a p-property.17
16When we say ‘as a p-feature,’ the ‘as’ (in this case only) is not meant to signify concept-
possession. S* need not possess the concept PHENOMENAL FEATURE. Our point is simply that
in whatever sense S* experiences F, it is not in a manner such that F makes a contributive difference
to the experience’s phenomenal character. That’s the sense in which S does not experience F as a
p-feature.
17For some purposes it may be helpful to think of redness as a determinable (a hue) whose
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The takeaway is that to experience scarletness as a p-property one must experi-
ence all the p-properties of scarletness that are essential to scarletness. Of course,
it does not follow from this that one is conscious of all the (non-phenomena)
essential features of scarletness, or conscious of the essential p-features of scar-
letness as essential features. But generalizing from this case about p-properties to
p-features, the following principle emerges: If F is a p-feature, then S must be con-
scious of all the p-features essential to F, but need not be conscious of F’s essential
p-features as essential p-features. This principle is our answer to the question we
started with: What features of a p-feature must one be conscious of in order to
experience the p-feature?
We can make the same point with p-shapes. Let triangular-shapes be the shapes
of closed three-sided figures, and let angular-shapes be the shapes formed when
two rays have the same end point, but do not lie on the same line. An essential
p-feature of any triangular-shape is that it has some-interior-angle-shapes.18 So,
again, our claim is that if the triangular-shape is a p-property—if the triangular-
shape itself types an experience by what it is like to have it—then S must be
conscious of some-interior-angle-shapes as a p-feature of the triangular-shape. It
is this p-feature that makes ‘triangular phenomenology’ what it is. If instead the
triangle was so small that it just looked like a dot on a piece of paper, S could,
in some sense, experience the triangle, but the triangular-shape would not itself
be a p-property. It would not be experienced as a p-property. And this is because
the triangle was too small for S to be conscious of its interior-angle-shapes, i.e.
a p-feature essential to p-triangularity. As before, S need not be conscious of the
interior angle-shapes as an essential feature of the triangular-shape. And S need
not be conscious of all the shape’s essential features. An essential feature of a
determinates include scarlet and crimson (they have the same hue). In this case S experiences
the determinate scarletness (its h, s and l) and S* experiences the determinable redness (h). This
way of thinking about the experiences of S and S* makes no difference to our argument for the
claim that these experiences are different experiences of different p-properties—scarletness for S,
redness for S*—and so have different phenomenal characters.
18Of course, the triangular-shape has three interior angle-shapes. However, we just used ‘some
interior angle-shapes’ because it is questionable that three-ness is phenomenal.
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(Euclidian) triangle is that its interior angles sum to 180 degrees. But this is not a
p-feature of a triangular-shape. We can have ‘triangle experiences’ without being
conscious of this. We cannot, however, have triangle experiences without being
conscious of all the p-features essential to the triangular-shape.
One final example, this time dealing only with p-relations. Let L be the p-
relation one-circle-surrounds-another and let B be the p-relation one-circle-is-
bigger-than-the-other. Now suppose I have a ‘concentric circle experience’—the
kind of experience I have when I direct my visual focus to two concentric cir-
cles on a piece of paper. B is an essential p-feature of L, although B can hold
between two circles that are not concentric. So L is an essential p-feature of my
concentric circle experience and B is a constitutive p-feature of L, which makes
B a constitutive p-feature of my experience. Thus, for S to have concentric circle
experience—for S to have an experience that it is typed by the p-relation L—S
must be conscious of B.
Given these considerations, the following holds:
Essential Features Necessarily, for any p-feature F, if subject S is conscious
of F, then S is conscious of (at least) all of the p-features
essential to F (F’, F’, F”’...) and of all their p-features
essential to them (that is, the p-features essential to F’,
F’, F”’...).
Essential Features is our auxiliary claim. It does not entail that S need be conscious
of any essential p-feature of a p-feature as an essential p-feature of that p-feature.
We have not provided a full-dress argument for this claim. But we do take the
above illustrations to show its attractiveness given The Type and Consciousness
Assumptions.
3.3 The Argument for P-Essentialism
The derivation of P-Essentialism begins by assuming the antecedent of both I-
Claim and Essential Features:
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E1 S is perceptually conscious of F in virtue of having E.
We then get:
E2 S is conscious of (at least) all of the p-features essential to F (F’, F’, F”’...)
and of all their p-features essential to them (that is, the p-features essential
to F’, F’, F”’...).
E3 None of the p-features essential to F seem to S to be a feature of E itself.
Here E2 is the consequent of Essential Features and E3 is the second conjunction
in the consequent of I-Claim.19 We then proceed via reductio:
E4 There is a p-relation R that holds between F and E that is essential to F.
[Assume for reductio]
E5 So, S is conscious of R. [first conjunct of 2, 4]
E6 An essential p-feature of R is that it is a p-relation between F and E that is
essential to F.
E7 So, S is conscious of R’s being a relation between F and E. [second con-
junct of 2, 5, 6]
E8 If none of the p-features essential to F seem to S to be a feature of E itself,
then S is not conscious of R’s being a relation between F and E.
E9 So, S is not conscious of R’s being a relation between F and E. [3,8]
E10 ⊥ [7,9]
19E3 is not quite (ii-I) of I-Claim, since E3 has ‘essential’ where (ii-I) does not. This addition
makes our derivation easier, but note that such a move is not elicit in this context; after all, Tye
would grant E3; if F does not seem to a subject S to be a feature of one’s experience E, then surely
none of the p-features essential to F will seem to S to be a feature of E. Notice also that the first
conjunct of I-Claim (i-I) does not play a role in our derivation of P-Essentialism. But as we saw,
the second conjunct (ii-I) does not play a role in Tye’s argument for P-Externalism.
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We get a contradiction on E10 from E7 and E9. Since E4 is our premise for re-
ductio, it follows that there is no p-relation R that holds between F and E that is
essential to F. In other words, we get P-Essentialism.
The argument is valid. The question is whether it is sound. In the present
context this turns on whether E6 and E8 is true.
On E6: note to begin with, that our argument is a general one that applies
to all perceptual experiences involving F’s and E’s. So, in E4, R is an instance
of a relation R that is to be understood as a p-relation that holds for all visual
experiences involving F’s and E’s that are essential to F’s. Hence these features
are essential to R, as E6 says.
On E8: the way something seems—in the phenomenal sense of ‘seems’—is a
matter of the property types we attribute to that thing. By the antecedent of E8,
neither F, nor any of the p-features essential to F, will seem to S to be a feature
of E. Thus if ‘F’ picked out p-red, S would not experience E itself as being of the
p-red type. Now R is a p-relation (a kind of p-feature) between F and E that is
essential to F. S could be conscious of R as being something other than a relation
between F and E, much in the way one could be conscious of a cow as being
something other than a cow (e.g. as a horse). In such a case R might not seem to
be a feature of E. But suppose the consequent of E8 were false; suppose S were
conscious of R’s being a relation between F and E. Then R would seem to S to be
a relation between F and E, and so a (relational) feature of E. This is because S
would be attributing to R a relational property (a property of a property); namely,
the property of being a relation (between F and E). But that’s just what it means
for S to be conscious of R’s being a relation. Hence, by contraposition, E8 is true.
At full measure, then, our transparency theory is the conjunction of I-Claim
(the introspective claim), P-Essentialism (our metaphysical claim), and Essential
Features (our auxiliary claim).
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3.4 Further Implications
3.4.1 For the Mind-Independence of P-Features
Here’s a question: what is it about the world that makes P-Essentialism true? The
cleanest answer is this:
No-Relation For any p-feature F and any perceptual experience E of F, no re-
lation holds between F and E that is essential to F.
From No-Relation it follows that p-features—be they p-colors, p-shapes, etc.—
are mind-independent. The reason is simple: for a p-feature (an F) to be mind-
independent just is a matter of there being no relation between the experience of
the p-feature (E) and the p-feature itself, that is essential to the p-feature.20
If there is a challenge to No-Relation, it comes from relational accounts of
color. Relational accounts hold that there is a connection between the way colors
look and the way colors are. So it might be thought that on relational accounts
of color No-Relation would be false. To see why this is not the case, let S be a
subject, or a set of subjects, and let C be a circumstance of some kind. Relational
accounts of color typically hold something like the following:
(1) x is red-for-S-in-C iff x is disposed to look red-for-S-in-C.21
Suppose that redness entered the triadic relation red-for-S-in-C as a monadic prop-
erty; that is, redness simply fills one term in a triadic relation. In this case the rela-
tional account of color would not capture all there is to color. Indeed the monadic
property would seem to be the metaphysically important color property. Hence
in (1) it is redness itself that is triadic. So (1) is not about p-redness, which is
20Both Tye’s theory and our theory make assumptions about the way experience is related to the
world: for Tye, Veridicality; for us, No-Relation. These claims are importantly different. Veridi-
cality concerns the accuracy of perceptual attributives of the form ‘x seems F.’ No-Relation, by
contrast, explains the non-existence of one type of relation between F and E (viz. p-relations) by
appeal to the non-existence of relations simpliciter between F and E. Perhaps Tye’s assumption
says more about the world, but as we saw this was his theory’s undoing.
21See McGinn (1983: 6), Johnston (1992: 248), and Cohen (2011: 182).
23
a monadic property, but about relational-redness. As such (1) is consistent with
No-Relation.
In addition, as we will show next, No-Relation faces no indirect challenge by
being inconsistent with a major theory of perception. Given this lack of argument
against No-Relation, we assume that abductive grounds—namely, No-Relation
explains why P-Essentialism is true—suffices to show that No-Relation follows
from P-Essentialism. And in this way, the mind-independence of p-features also
follows from P-Essentialism.
3.4.2 For Perceptual Experience
P-Essentialism is consistent with representationalism. Representationalism does
not imply that there is a p-relation between F and E that is essential to F. Nor does
naive realism imply that there is a p-relation between F and E that is essential to F.
In addition, both views are consistent with the best explanation for P-Essentialism
being that there is no relation between F and E that is essential to F. So represen-
tationalism and nave realism are consistent with No-Relation too.
What about qualia realism and projectivism? On literal projectivism: the literal
projectivist will maintain that seeing something as p-red (or any other p-color)
necessarily involves p-redness being instantiated in the subject’s visual system.
So it might be an essential feature of an experience that it instantiates p-redness,
when the subject sees something as p-red. So in this case F may have an essential
relation, the instantiation relation, to E. But this is not to claim that it is essential
to p-redness that it be instantiated in a visual system; E is not essentially related
to F. Consider the thesis that granite instantiates p-redness, although we do not
perceive this property of granite and scientists have not discovered this property
to be in granite. Projectivism does not imply that this thesis is false because granite
is not part of a visual system; that is, as far as literal projectivism is concerned p-
redness could be instantiated in granite. Hence, on a literal projectivist account of
color it is a contingent feature of p-redness that it is instantiated in some visual
systems. As such, in this case it is a contingent feature of F that it is instantiated
24
in a visual system. So, projectivism is compatible with both P-Essentialism and
No-Relation: projectivism does not require that there is a relation, phenomenal or
otherwise, between F and E that is essential to F.
Although qualia realism is rarely (if ever) fully developed in positive terms,
the basic idea is simple enough: perceptual experiences instantiate intrinsic, nor-
matively inert, introspectively accessible properties called qualia. And the set of
qualia an experience instantiates constitutes that experience’s phenomenal charac-
ter (cf. Speaks 2014). So qualia play the role of p-features. As such, qualia realism
can plausibly be treated like projectivism; although it is essential to my having a
reddish experience that it instantiates a certain quale Q, it is not essential to Q
that it be instantiated by my experience. So, qualia realism is compatible with
No-Relation, and a fortiori P-Essentialism.
That P-Essentialism is consistent, but does not entail, virtually every live the-
ory of perceptual experience, or some kinds of perceptual experience, tells against
the optimistic meta-theoretical position.22 We cannot look to transparency as a
means to finding out which of the various accounts of perceptual experience is
correct.
3.4.3 For Revelation
A final point. Bertrand Russell, Mark Johnston and Galen Strawson all examine
something like the following epistemic claim about color: by simply having an
experience of color, one is in a position to know the essential nature of (that)
color. This, roughly, is Revelation.
There are various ways of filling out Revelation. Here are three. Mark Johnston
says that, on Revelation, “[t]he intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed
by a standard visual experience of a canary yellow thing” (1992: 223). Johnston
22We say ‘live’ because P-Essentialism is incompatible with sense datum theories. We do not
know of any current sense-datum theorists, but it’s not clear if sense-datum theories are theories of
perceptual experience anyway. There is a common reading where they are just theories of what we
are most immediately acquainted with in experience. In that case, ruling out sense-datum theory
would support the modest position.
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does not say what ‘fully revealed’ comes. But a reasonable idea is this: for the
intrinsic nature of canary yellow to be fully revealed in experience, it is necessary
to be conscious of the essential features of canary yellow as essential features.23
Byrne and Hilbert (2007: 77), by contrast, focus on two claims:
Self-Intimation If it is in the nature of the colors that p, then after careful re-
flection on color experience it seems to be in the nature of the
colors that p.
Infallibility If after careful reflection on color experience it seems to be in
the nature of the colors that p, then it is in the nature of the color
that p.
Revelation, according to Byrne and Hilbert, is the conjunction of Self-Intimation
and Infallibility.
Finally, let Revelation Light be this claim: we are conscious of the essential
p-features of p-colors in virtue of having an experience of color. Revelation Light
follows from Essential Features.
Revelation Light is the most plausible of these accounts. Color scientists try to
tease out the essential p-features of p-colors by carefully considering what people
seem to see, under all sorts of conditions, when they have experiences of p-colors.
This investigation shows that, as explained earlier, every p-color has a hue, a sat-
uration and a lightness, which are essential to it. Furthermore, the investigation
shows that some hues are binary (e.g. every orange is to some degree reddish and
to some degree yellowish) and some hues have unique instances (e.g., for a normal
observer there is a red that is neither yellowish or blueish). The upshot is that it
takes work to discover that the essential features of p-colors are essential features.
So simply experiencing a p-color would be enough to reveal its essential features,
but not enough to fully reveal them—i.e., reveal them as essential features—which
Johnston’s account seems to imply. That is, when color scientists are analyzing p-
colors, they are assuming that the essential features of p-colors are part of our
23Although Johnston’s initial statement of Revelation employs ‘intrinsic’, he later also employs
‘essential’ (1992: 139). Johnston eventually gives up Revelation though, albeit begrudgingly.
26
experiences of p-colors; but they are not assuming that these essential features
are readily apparent as essential features. Of course this is what Essential Fea-
tures claims about p-colors. So Revelation Light, which follows from Essential
Features, is a better account of p-color experience than Johnston’s account.24
Regarding Byrne and Hilbert’s take, Essential Features does not imply Self-
Intimation if Self-Intimation is taken to imply consciousness that something is an
essential feature. And Self-Intimation is a strong claim anyway; too strong, given
the above considerations about the scientific investigation of color. The bigger is-
sue though is Infallibility. From I-Claim p-colors seem to be properties of objects.
Thus by Infallibility it is part of the very nature of p-colors that they are prop-
erties of objects. But clearly that’s false—just consider perceptual illusions and
hallucinations. Furthermore, scientists who are (implicitly) using something like
Revelation to investigate the nature of p-colors do not assume that p-colors are
properties of objects. Hardin (1988: 111), who is well-known for his study of the
science of p-colors, is explicit on this point. And some color scientists are also
explicit in their rejection of the claim that p-colors should be assumed to be prop-
erties of objects.25 So the Byrne and Hilbert account of Revelation, interpreted as
a thesis about p-color, is not plausible. But Essential Features works well.
These points do not directly support the modest position. But they do support
it indirectly, by showing how our theory’s auxiliary claim—Essential Features—
does not imply anything obviously implausible about p-color. For if it did, we
would have less reason to believe our theory, and as result, anything it might imply,
or not imply, about experiences and their objects.
4 A Plea for Modesty
For the past twenty-five years, the transparency of experience has been the central
point of theoretical contention in the philosophy of perception. If this is hyperbole,
24For the (implicit) use of Revelation in scientific investigations of color, see Boynton (1979:
30-31) and Hurvich (1981: 3-11).
25Here are three examples: Boynton (1979: 26-7); Zeki (1983: 764); Palmer (1999: 95, 97).
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it’s barely so. The core idea is not obviously new (fn. 2), but Harman’s Eloise was
galvanizing. And we believe that the attention afforded to transparency is a good
thing, since the phenomenon is important. But our view is that its importance
lies not in what it tells us about perceptual experiences—it doesn’t really tell us
anything—but in what it can tell us about the objects of experience.
Our argument for this modest meta-theoretical position and against the opti-
mistic position had two prongs. The first focused on Tye’s transparency theory. We
argued that (i) Tye’s theory is flawed, and that (ii) even if it were not flawed—even
if Tye’s argument for P-Externalism were compelling—Tye’s theory is plausibly
seen as telling against the optimistic meta-theoretical position, and in favor of the
modest position. The second prong focused on developing a new transparency the-
ory that does not suffer from the flaws of Tye’s theory, yet also favors the modest
position. So what we have tried to do is make the prima facie case for the mod-
est meta-theoretical position more robust. Transparency should encourage only
modesty about experiences. We leave it to the reader to determine if our plea for
modesty should be heeded.26
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